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Abstract
Intrusion is widely recognized as a chronic and recurring problem of computer systems’ security with the continual changes
and increasing volume of hacking techniques. This paper explores a new countermeasure approach for anomaly-based intrusion
detection using a multicriterion fuzzy classification method combined with a greedy attribute selection. The proposed approach has
the advantage of dealing with various types of attributes including network traﬃc basic TCP/IP packet headers, as well as content-
based, time-based and host-based attributes. At the same time, to reduce the dimensionality and increase the computational
eﬃciency, the greedy attribute selection algorithm enables it to choose an optimal subset of attributes that is most relevant for
detecting intrusive events. The simplicity of the constructed model allows it to be replicated at various network components in
emerging open system infrastructures such as sensor networks, wireless ad hoc networks, cloud computing, and smart grids. The
proposed approach is evaluated and compared on a commonly-used intrusion detection benchmark dataset. The results show more
than 99.9% overall accuracy with high detection rates for various types of intrusions can be achieved with about 26% only of the
available attributes.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Program Chairs of FNC-2014.
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1. Introduction
Numerous types of cyber attacks are launched against computer systems such as port scanning, traﬃc sniﬃng,
denial of service, address spoofing, session hijacking, vulnerability exploits, unauthorized access and privilege esca-
lation. The growth rate of intrusion is ever increasing to alarming levels as mentioned in recent security reports 1,2.
This problem is getting worse with the emerging network technologies and environments such as sensor networks,
smart grids, wireless ad hoc network, cloud computing, mobile applications, and social networks. To provide rea-
sonable protection for such critical infrastructures, a number of signature-based solutions and technologies are often
deployed to detect misuse patterns and control access including ant-viruses, anti-spywares and packet-based firewall
filters. These methods have proven their eﬀectiveness in detecting attacks of known signatures but they fail to deal
with zero-day attacks, attacks with slightly varying signatures, or sophisticated attacks. A more flexible and adaptive
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +966-13-860-1930.
E-mail address: alfy@kfupm.edu.sa
  Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://cr ativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Conference Program Chairs
56   El-Sayed M. El-Alfy and Feras N. Al-Obeidat /  Procedia Computer Science  34 ( 2014 )  55 – 62 
set of approaches based on machine learning and data mining have been proposed to detect the stochastic deviation
from normal behavior patterns. This category of methods is known as anomaly-based intrusion detection which pro-
vides a higher degree of automation and reduces the workload on security experts. Despite the variety of methods that
have been proposed in the literature, the research on anomaly detection is still evolving to cope with uncertainties, im-
prove the security, reduce false positive rate, and reduce computational costs3,4. Additionally, since the performance
to detect intrusive events is greatly influenced by type and number of attributes utilized5, it is desirable to consider
various attributes during the model construction phase.
Multicriterion decision making techniques were originally devised in the operations research field and have at-
tracted attention of several researchers in domains such as social psychology, business management, and health care6,7.
However, there is not much work done in the area of network security. In this paper, we investigate a new method-
ology for anomaly-based intrusion detection based on multicriterion decision making fuzzy classification, known as
PROAFTN8,9, combined with a greedy hill-climbing search for attribute selection. With the minimum generaliza-
tion error and the resulting simplicity and reduced computational complexity of the model, the proposed approach is
practically feasible to be applied in the domain of network intrusion detection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews related work. In Section 3, the proposed
methodology is introduced. A description of the dataset and a discussion of the experimental work are provided in
Section 4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Related Work
Computational intelligence techniques have many characteristics such as adaption and fault tolerance that made
them attractive for research on intrusion detection. In3, a review of 55 related studies between 2000 and 2007 is
presented with focus on single, hybrid, and ensemble classifiers. Another extensive review is presented in 10. Examples
of these techniques include neural networks, fuzzy inference systems, evolutionary algorithms, artificial immune
systems, and swarm intelligence. In11, a naive Bayesian classifier is applied to identify potential intrusions. Trained
on a small subset of KDD’99 dataset and tested on a larger subset, this approach showed superior identification
rate. A number of hybrid machine learning approaches have been proposed as well. For instance, in12 a machine
learning approach is introduced for classifying network activities as normal or abnormal. This approach combines
support vector machines with clustering based on self-organized ant colony network. The authors demonstrated that
this combination resulted in better classification rate and run time. Anomaly-based intrusion detection has attracted
the interest of several researchers3. However, these methods can suﬀer from increased false positive rate. To gain
advantage of misuse detection and anomaly detection, Depren et al. proposed a rule-based decision support system to
combine the outcomes of decision tree for misuse detection and self-organizing map for modeling normal behavior 13.
Another important stage that can have significant impact on the accuracy and capability of intrusion detection sys-
tems is data preprocessing. A review of data preprocessing techniques for anomaly-based network intrusion detection
is presented in5. Data preprocessing covers various approaches such as normalization and selection of most relevant
attributes. The impact of data normalization on the performance of support vector machines for intrusion detection is
investigated in14. It has been found that min-max normalization leads to better results in terms of speed and accuracy
than other normalization techniques. Another important related issue is attribute selection to reduce the high dimen-
sionality and complexity15. Most of the work published in the literature is evaluated using the standard KDD Cup 99
dataset12,14,11,15. Despite some critiques against the aging of this dataset, it remains a benchmark dataset especially
for evaluating new approaches.
3. Methodology
The proposed methodology for anomaly-based intrusion detection consists of two major steps as explained in the
following subsections.
3.1. Relevant Attribute Selection
When datasets include attributes that are not relevant or may contain redundant attributes, this causes delay in
building the classification model and accordingly degrade the classification accuracy. Hence, we start with an attribute
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subset selection approach to enhance the performance of the multicriterion fuzzy classification method. So, the target
here is to reduce the hypothesis search space and improve the performance in terms of accuracy, scalability and
eﬃciency.
Without loss of generality, we adopted a forward attribute selector that uses a correlation based heuristic to deter-
mine the usefulness of attributes, and evaluates its eﬀectiveness with the PROAFTN method. The application of this
approach as a preprocessing step allows selection of relevant attributes in reasonable time. The search for the best
subset of attributes is conducted using a greedy hill-climbing augmented with a backtracking facility.
Selection of attributes is based on the hypothesis made by Hall 16 that “subsets of features that are highly correlated
with the class while having low inter-correlation are preferred”. It starts with an empty set of attributes and iteratively
evaluates all single attribute additions and adds the attribute with the highest merit (i.e. highest predictive power and
smallest degree of redundancy with other attributes in the set). The evaluation function for a particular subset of
attributes is defined mathematically as follows16:
f (s) = kr¯ca√
k + k(k − 1)r¯aa
(1)
where k is the size of the subset s, r¯ca is the mean of attribute-class correlations, and r¯aa is the mean of the attribute-
attribute correlations. This function will have lower values for attributes that are irrelevant (small value for the numer-
ator) and/or redundant (large value for the denominator).
3.2. Multicriterion Fuzzy Classification
The anomaly-based intrusion detection problem can be solved by a multicriterion fuzzy classification approach
which assigns behavioral patterns to predefined classes. This type of decision problems requires a comparison between
alternatives or patterns based on the scores of attributes using absolute evaluations17. In this case, the evaluation is
performed by comparing the alternatives to diﬀerent prototypes of classes, where the category or class is assigned to
patterns based on the highest score value. Each prototype is described by a set of attributes and is considered to be
a good representative of its class18. The complexity of this approach is a function of the number of attributes. Thus,
utilizing the smallest subset of relevant attributes greatly improves the time complexity and accuracy of classification.
To explain how it works, assume the network behavioral pattern is described by a set of m attributes {g1, g2, . . . , gm}
and a label c identifying its category which belongs to the k classes Ω = {C1,C2, . . . ,Ck}. Given a set of N historical
patterns P, it is required to construct a classification model f : P → Ω that can accurately predict the target class of
each pattern. Once the model is built, it can be used to assign the most relevant class to new unseen behavioral patterns.
The model parameters are automatically determined from the training data examples. Then, the constructed model
is used for assigning a category to the unseen cases (testing data). This automatic data-driven approach is common
to the learning procedures in other machine learning classifiers19,20. The main steps of the classifier construction are
outlined in Algorithm 1. The learning strategy is based on utilizing the training set to compose a set of prototypes for
each class. For class Ch, these prototypes are denoted as Bh = {bh1, bh2, . . . , bhLh } where Lh is the number of prototypes
for this class. For each prototype bhi and each attribute g j, a fuzzy partial indiﬀerence relation C j(a, bhi ) is defined to
measure the degree of resemblance of the pattern a to bhi according to g j. This fuzzy relation is characterized by four
parameters: the interval [S 1j (bhi ), S 2j (bhi )] where S 2j (bhi ) ≥ S 1j (bhi ) and the thresholds d1j (bhi ) and d2j (bhi ). Figure 1 shows
a typical example of a fuzzy relation with the four parameters illustrated to divide the range of values of g j into three
regions: strong indiﬀerence, weak indiﬀerence, and no indiﬀerence.
In this work, the supervised discretization technique introduced by Fayyad and Irani21, which is based the cal-
culation of entropy, is utilized to generate the interval [S 1j (bhi ), S 2j (bhi )] for each class prototype and each attribute.
To determine the values for d1j (bhi ) and d2j (bhi ), an adjustment/tuning is applied on S 1j (bhi ) and S 2j (bhi ) to allow more
flexibility in assigning patterns to the closest classes. The intervals adjustment can be expressed mathematically as
follows:
d1j (bhi ) = βS 1j (bhi ), and d2j (bhi ) = βS 2j (bhi ); β ∈ [0, 1]
The prototypes in this study are constructed based on the frequency of combined values from all attributes in the
dataset. After implementing the supervised discretization technique, each attribute will have a set of intervals and
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Fig. 1. A typical example of the partial indiﬀerence fuzzy relation between the object a and the prototype bhi according to attribute g j.
nominal values. The learning strategy starts from the first attribute in the list and select the first interval or nominal
value from list of values that belong to the attribute. Then, it proceeds to the next attribute and selects the first
interval/nominal value then counts the frequency of the occurrences for these combined values in each class. If the
frequency exceeds the preselected threshold (e.g. more than 15%) then these values are added to the first prototype.
The learning continues until all intervals and nominal values are examined by the above discussed strategy. The target
is to reach all values for value-attribute from the first attribute to the last one.
Algorithm 1 Composing PROAFTN’s prototypes (classification model)
1: i : prototype’s index
2: h : class index
3: m : attribute’s index
4: Select threshold β for interval selection
5: Generate intervals using a discretization technique
6: Apply greedy hill climbing approach to select most relevant subsets
7: for each class do
8: for each attribute g do
9: for every value in attribute r do
10: Recursively check all values in the next attribute gm
11: if Frequency of values  β then
12: Choose intervals for prototype bhi
13: else
14: Discard interval and go next (i.e., Ir2g2h)
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: end for
To classify a pattern a to the class Ch, PROAFTN calculates the membership degree δ(a,Ch) as follows:
δ(a,Ch) = max{I(a, bh1), I(a, bh2), ..., I(a, bhLh )} (2)
where I(a, bhj ) is the fuzzy indiﬀerence relation which is computed as a weighted sum of the partial indiﬀerence
relations as given by:
I(a, bhi ) =
m∑
j=1
wjhC j(a, bhi ) (3)
where wjh is the weight that measures the importance of a relevant attribute g j of a specific class Ch:
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w jh ∈ [0, 1], and
m∑
j=1
wjh = 1 (4)
The last step is to assign the pattern a to the class Ch that has the maximum resemblance according to the following
decision rule:
a ∈ Ch ⇔ δ(a,Ch) = max{δ(a,Ci)|i ∈ {1, ..., k}} (5)
4. Experimental Work
4.1. Dataset Description
The dataset used in our experimental work is adopted from the KDD Cup 99 (KDD’99) dataset 22. This dataset is
an adapted version of the dataset prepared and managed by MIT Lincoln Labs as part of the 1998 DARPA Intrusion
Detection Evaluation Program. KDD’99 was first used for the third International Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining Tools Competition in 1999. Since then, KDD’99 became a dominant intrusion detection dataset which has
been and still widely used by most researchers to evaluate and benchmark their related work 12,14,11,15. The dataset
consists of processed TCP dump portions of normal and attack connections to a local area network simulating a
military network environment. There are 22 attacks in the dataset falling into four main categories, namely: denial
of service (DoS) such as syn flood, unauthorized access from a remote machine (R2L) such as password guess,
unauthorized access to local root privileges (U2R) such as rootkit, and probing such as port scan and nmap.
The dataset has 494021 connections; each connection is described with 41 attributes and has a label identifying
the type as either normal or one of the attacks. Three attributes are symbolic, five attributes are binary, whereas
the remaining 33 attributes are numeric. The attributes are divided into four groups: basic attributes of individual
connections (9 attributes), content attributes within a connection suggested by domain knowledge (13 attributes),
time-based traﬃc attributes computed using a two-second time window (9 attributes), and host-based traﬃc attributes
computed using a window of 100 connections to the same host (10 attributes). A summary of these attributes is
provided in Table 1.
4.2. Performance Measures
The proposed method for anomaly-based intrusion detection is evaluated and compared with other approaches
using stratified 10-fold cross validation and the performance is reported in terms of accuracy, recall (true positive
rate), precision, and F1 measure. These measures are computed as follows:
accuracy = (tp + tn)/(tp + tn + f p + f n) (6)
recall = tp/(tp + f n) (7)
precision = tp/(tp + f p) (8)
F1 = 2 × precision × recall/(precision + recall) (9)
where tp refers to true positive, tn refers to true negative, f p refers to false positive, f n refers to false negative. We
also compared the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC) and the time to construct the
classification model.
4.3. Experiments and Results
The proposed learning methodology was implemented in Java and run in a Linux machine. We applied it to the
network anomaly-based intrusion detection benchmark dataset without and with attribute selection. For attribute
selection, we used the supervised correlation-based subset attribute selection with greedy hill-climbing. Out of the
41 attributes, only 11 attributes (approx. 26%) are returned by the attribute selector as follows: a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7,
a8, a14, a23, a30, a36 (their descriptions are as given in Table 1). We also tested another approach for attribute ranking
and selection, but it returned 29 attributes and the performance of the classifier was worse and with higher time
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Table 1. Summary of various attributes: category, notation, name, type (numeric, categorical, binary), statistics and description.
Statistics
Cat. Not. Name Type Min Max Description
basic
a1 duration num. 0 58329 Connection length in seconds
a2 pro type cat. – – Prototype type which can be tcp, udp, or icmp.
a3 srv cat. – – Service on the destination; there are 67 potential values such as http,
ftp, telnet, domain, etc.
a4 flag cat. – – Normal or error status of the connection; there are 11 potential val-
ues, e.g. rej, sh, etc.
a5 src bytes num. 0 693M Num. of bytes from the source to the destination
a6 dst bytes num. 0 52M Num. of bytes from the destination to the source
a7 land binary – – Whether conn. from/to same host/port or not
a8 wrng frg num. 0 3 Number of wrong fragments
a9 urg num. 0 3 Number of urgent packets
content
a10 hot num. 0 30 Number of hot indicators
a11 n failed lgns num. 0 5 Number of failed login attempts
a12 logged in binary – – Whether successfully logged in or not
a13 n cmprmsd num. 0 884 Number of compromised conditions
a14 rt shell binary – – Whether root shell is obtained or not
a15 su attmptd num. 0 2 Number of “su root” commands attempted
a16 n rt num. 0 993 Number of accesses to the root
a17 n file crte num. 0 28 Number of create-file operations
a18 n shells num. 0 2 Number of shell prompts
a19 n access files num. 0 8 Number of operations on access control files
a20 n obnd cmds num. 0 0 Number of outbound commands in an ftp session
a21 is hot lgn binary – – Whether login belongs to hot list or not
a22 is guest lgn binary – – Whether guest login or not
t traﬃc (using a window of 2 seconds)
a23 cnt num. 0 511 Number of same-host connections as the current connection in the
past 2 seconds
a24 srv cnt num. 0 511 Num. of same-host conn. to the same service as the current connec-
tion in the past 2 seconds
a25 syn err num. 0 1 Percentage of same-host conn. with syn errors
a26 srv syn err num. 0 1 Percentage of same-service conn. with syn errors
a27 rej err num. 0 1 Percentage of same-host conn. with rej errors
a28 srv rej err num. 0 1 Percentage of same-service conn. with rej errors
a29 sm srv r num. 0 1 Percentage of same-host conn. to same service
a30 dﬀ srv r num. 0 1 Percentage of same-host conn. to diﬀerent services
a31 srv dﬀ hst r num. 0 1 Percentage of same-service conn. to diﬀerent hosts
h traﬃc (using a window of 100 connections)
a32 h cnt num. 0 255 Number of same-host connections as the current connection in the
past 100 connections
a33 h srv cnt num. 0 255 Num. of same-host conn. to the same service as the current connec-
tion in the past 100 connections
a34 h sm srv r num. 0 1 Percentage of same-host conn.to same service
a35 h dﬀ srv r num. 0 1 Percentage of same-host conn. to diﬀerent services
a36 h sm sr prt r num. 0 1 Percentage of same-service conn. to diﬀerent hosts
a37 h srv dﬀ hst r num. 0 1 Percentage of same-service conn. to diﬀerent hosts
a38 h syn err num. 0 1 Percentage of same-host conn. with syn errors
a39 h srv syn err num. 0 1 Percentage of same-service conn. with syn errors
a40 h rej err num. 0 1 Percentage of same-host conn. with rej errors
a41 h srv rej err num. 0 1 Percentage of same-service conn. with rej errors
complexity. So, we focused only on the greedy attribute selection. We conducted a comparative study with popular
machine learning algorithms implemented in23 with default settings using the stratified 10-fold cross-validation. Table
2 summarizes the performance comparisons of the proposed method with three other classifiers (decision tree ID3,
support vector machine (SVM) and multi-layer perceptron (MLP)).
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Table 2. Comparisons of accuracy versus time complexity for diﬀerent approaches.
Approach Accuracy (%) Time (seconds)
Without attribute selection:
Proposed 98.46 12
ID3 98.02 15
SVM 97.58 33
MLP 96.24 48
With attribute selection:
Proposed 99.96 7
ID3 98.78 15
SVM 98.58 21
MLP 96.84 32
Table 3. The per-class performance of the proposed method without and with attribute selection (approx. to three digits).
Without attribute selection With attribute selection
Normal/Attack Count Precision Recall F1 AUC Precision Recall F1 AUC
normal 97278 0.990 0.989 0.989 0.990 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
back 2203 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.989 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
buﬀer overflow 30 0.723 0.678 0.700 0.848 0.674 0.606 0.639 0.919
ftp write 8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.573 0.404 0.253 0.311 1.000
guess passwd 53 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.962 0.990 0.935 0.961 0.990
imap 12 0.157 0.240 0.190 0.670 1.000 0.169 0.289 0.883
ipsweep 1247 0.985 0.983 0.984 0.989 0.928 0.993 0.959 1.000
land 21 0.847 0.937 0.890 0.919 0.960 0.914 0.937 0.962
loadmodule 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.766 0.336 0.112 0.169 0.876
multihop 7 0.276 0.323 0.298 0.847 0.253 0.144 0.184 0.933
neptune 107201 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
nmap 231 0.938 0.981 0.959 0.981 0.957 0.547 0.696 1.000
perl 3 0.323 0.990 0.490 0.980 1.000 0.336 0.505 0.981
phf 4 0.990 0.657 0.790 0.990 1.000 0.253 0.404 0.983
pod 264 0.990 0.986 0.988 0.990 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
portsweep 1040 0.977 0.982 0.979 0.987 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000
rootkit 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.662 0.865 0.768 0.813 0.776
satan 1589 0.981 0.984 0.982 0.987 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
smurf 280790 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
spy 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.443 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
teardrop 979 0.989 0.990 0.989 0.989 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
warezclient 1020 0.968 0.982 0.975 0.988 1.000 0.986 0.994 1.000
warezmaster 20 0.790 0.752 0.770 0.910 0.842 0.758 0.797 0.902
Without attribute selection, the overall accuracy generated by PROAFTN is 98.46%. The decision tree ID3 ap-
proach achieved a classification accuracy of 98.02%; yet the size of the tree is so huge with many branches (812
branches with up to 694 leaves). The classification accuracy generated for SVM and MLP was 97.58 % and 96.24
%, respectively. Also it is worth noting that the time for building the PROAFTN classification model was reasonable
compared with the aforementioned classifiers even though we are dealing with a big dataset. Comparing the time re-
quired to build the model, PROAFTN took 12 seconds whereas ID3 took 15 seconds. SVM and MLP were relatively
time consuming; as each model required 33 and 48 seconds, respectively.
On the other hand, when greedy search attribute selection is used, the overall accuracy has improved for all clas-
sifiers. However, the proposed approach has significantly improved in terms of classification accuracy of 99.96%
and training time of 7 seconds. In contrast, the decision tree ID3 approach achieved a classification accuracy of
98.78% but the size of the tree has increased with 886 branches and up to 784 leaves. Comparing with support vector
machine (SVM) and multi-layer perceptron (MLP), the accuracy was 98.58 % and 96.84 %, respectively. The time
required to build ID3, SVM and MLP models was relatively longer (15, 21 and 32 seconds, respectively). The detailed
performance of PROAFTN for each class is summarized in Table 3.
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5. Conclusion
A novel security countermeasure is proposed in this paper for anomaly-based intrusion detection. First a greedy
search approach is applied for selecting the optimal subset of attributes. Then, a fuzzy-based multicriterion classi-
fication model is constructed and evaluated on a publicly available and widely used dataset. The results are very
promising in terms of classification accuracy and model construction time. For instance, with only 11 attributes out
of the 41 available attributes, the proposed classification model with attribute selection was able to yield more than
99.9% overall accuracy with very high detection rates for each attack type. As future work, it is intended to test the
methodology on other datasets and feature selection methods.
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